Abstract-Near field communication (NFC) systems provide a good location-limited channel so that many security systems can use it to force the participants to stay close to each other. Unfortunately, only a small number of smart devices in the market are equipped with NFC chips that are essential for NFC systems. The purpose of this paper is to provide the same feature, called near field authentication (NFA), without using NFC chips. We propose an easy-to-use system to achieve NFA by using human finger movement on the touch screens of two nearby smart devices. Our system does not need any prior secret information shared between two devices and generates the same high-entropy cryptographic key for both devices in a successful authentication. The efficiency of the system is demonstrated by our evaluation on a Motorola Droid smartphone.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our work is motivated by a common scenario of using smart devices, such as smartphones or tablets. Two people, say Alice and Bob, meet each other in person with their smart devices. They want to set up a one-time secure channel between the two devices so that Alice can send files to Bob confidentially. They should first invoke some key exchange (KE) protocol, such as Diffie-Hellman KE protocol, to agree on a one-time session key. Without authentication, such a KE protocol is usually vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. In our case, Alice and Bob can carry out the KE protocol on a near field communication (NFC) system to defend against MITM attacks, because the NFC can only work within a distance less than a few centimeters. However, not all smart devices are equipped with a NFC chip. The goal of this work is to help those smart devices, that do not have NFC chips and can only have access to insecure public networks, such as wireless LAN, to authenticate another smart device in the near field. We call this kind of authentication near field authentication (NFA).
With the widespread usage of smart devices, we will see a large amount of near field applications. One example is paywith-smartphones, which is currently one of the hottest applications on smartphone platforms. People store their credit card information in smartphones and make purchases by putting their smartphones close to a reader. In order to promote near field applications and let more smart devices benefit from this new technique, it is necessary to have a system that performs NFA on smart devices which do not have NFC chips.
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failure and the fact that the Internet access may not always be available. , it is preferable to perform NFA over local networks, such as bluetooth or wireless LAN. Mayrhofer and Gellersen proposed two authentication protocols in [9] with the purpose of pairing two devices. Their protocols are not suitable for some large or fixed devices, such as tablets and self-service check in machines.
We propose to use a new motion, finger movement on touch screen, to construct a near field authentication system. In order to force two smart devices to be spatially close to each other, we let a person use two fingers of one hand -usually the index finger and the middle finger -to simultaneously move on the screens of the two smart devices, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Since the two finger movements are done by one hand, they are highly coherent to each other. We leverage this coherence to generate the session key for the two smart devices.
We make the following contributions in this paper.
• We propose to use finger movement to perform near field authentication between two smart devices. Compared with the previous motion patterns, such as bump, shake, etc., finger movement is easier to carry out on devices and provides better user experience.
• We design a robust feature so that two extracted feature data sets are similar to each other. We propose to use the time between the starting point and a peak point as the feature to be extracted in our system. • We propose an efficient system to remove the differences between two extracted feature data sets and generate a high-entropy cryptographic key.
• Our system is efficient and proved to be secure in the random oracle model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce related works in Sec. II. We formulate the NFA problem and discuss the design goals in Sec. III. We present the design and constructions in Sec. IV and Sec. V, respectively. We analyze the system in Sec. V and present the experiment results in Sec. VII. We conclude our work in Sec. VIII. 
II. RELATED WORK
Many other prior works used various sensors on smartphones to achieve location enforcement. The commercial app BUMP [1] uses accelerometer to quickly match two smartphones for data transmission. As we introduced previously, BUMP system compares the data measured during a bump between two intended devices to match the two devices and provides confidential communications. The app is intuitive to use and needs less human involvement. Their system security and efficiency rely on the BUMP server, modeled as a trusted center. However, the server itself may suffer from single-pointof-failure problem [8] . For our scenario, the trusted center scheme is not a suitable choice either, because the Internet accessibility is not always available when people want to perform authentication on smart devices. Some works [9, 11] proposed to use a different motion pattern -shake by a person -so as to achieve location enforcement. The accelerometer sensor was used to sense the motion once again. Mayrhofer and Gellersen used a signal processing approach to remove the differences between sensed data sets and a key exchange protocol to generate a session key [9] . The protocols in [9] do not need a trusted center, which is the same as our system. Although shake may provide the sensed data with more variations [9] , it is difficult to hold and shake a big smart device, such as tablet. Another interesting near field channel is to use vibrations to transmit secret, which was proposed by [10] and [5] . The authors used the vibration that is produced by one device to encode the secret and the accelerometer of the other to sense and decode the secret. Recently, Studer et al. [11] proposed a MITM attack against those motion based approaches. They assumed that there is a powerful adversary who can observe the user's motion, such as shake or bump, so that he can emulate a similar motion pattern to carry out a MITM attack. While the success rate of their attack was sensitive to the delay induced by the attacker, their work did suggest that a smaller motion pattern is preferred than shake and bump when a third person is standing nearby.
III.PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
A near field authentication system is a mutual authentication system between two parties. When the authentication is successfully passed, the system convinces both parties that they are separated in a distance less than a few centimeters. In addition, at the end of a successful authentication, a NFA system assigns the same cryptographic session key to both parties. For convenience, we use two human names Alice and Bob to denote these two parties, which are actually two devices. Our construction asks a user, who is called conductor in this paper, to slide two fingers of one hand over the two screens to achieve location enforcement.
B. Attack Model
The two smart devices involved in the authentication, including their executing applications, are considered trusted and not compromised. Safeguarding a smart device against being compromised by an outside attacker has been well studied in the area of intrusion detection and is out of the study of this work.
In this paper, we consider a fully malicious adversary, who controls public communication channels. The adversary is able to eavesdrop any communication, tamper, delay, replay, inject and block messages. During a protocol instance, the adversary can carry out a MITM attack, impersonating one party to communicate with the other honest one. The purpose of the adversary in this work is to obtain the session key generated by a NFA system without being captured, so that he can decrypt and obtain the succeeding communication messages.
C. Design Goals
In addition to defending against the adversary that is modeled in Sec. III-B, we expect a NFA system to achieve the following design goals.
-It needs less human involvement and is intuitive to use. -It does not rely on prior knowledge. -It is decentralized and uses local network.
IV. DESIGN OF AN NFA SYSTEM
A. System Overview system, when a conductor triggers an authentication process, two devices sense finger movements on their individual touch screens and extract the feature data locally. Using the extracted data, the two devices interact with each other to agree on a series of the same data and generate the same session key. Finally, the two devices verify that the generated session keys are identical before they use them to protect succeeding communications.
B. Feature Design
A zigzag movement forms a series of curves, which provide many features to be extracted. We propose to use a new temporal feature -the time between a peak point and the starting point, i.e., the peak point's elapsed time. As shown in Fig. 1 , the starting point is the point where a finger first touches the screen and peak points are the points where the finger moving direction changes. A time value collected by touch screen is accurate to 10 −6 second, but such a high accuracy also causes high sensitiveness and low robustness. Hence, we round a time value to the nearest decimal fraction with 2-digit fractional part. Finally, we drop off the decimal separator to make the value an integer.
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1) Variations
A feature with more variations is more difficult to be guessed by attackers. The variations of our feature can be reflected by the distribution of time intervals between each two continuous peak points. Fig. 3(a) We collected data from four different persons. Fig. 3(b) shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) curves of the four time interval sets. It shows that there is an obvious gap between each two ECDF curves, indicating that different people have different finger movement patterns. For example, person 2 moves fingers fast so that all his time intervals are smaller than 0.5 second while person 1 would like to move fingers much slower.
2) Similarity
We call a peak point in one sequence and its counterpart in the other a pair. Finally, we calculated the absolute difference between the two elapsed time values in each pair. A set of such absolute difference values can be viewed as a measurement of the similarity between two sensed feature data sets. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of the absolute differences between two peak point sequences. The experiments represented by the yellow bars were carried out on two Motorola Droid smartphones, while the experiments represented by the green bars were carried out on two different smart devices -one is Motorola Droid smartphone and the other one is HP TouchPad TM tablet. For comparison purpose, we also calculated the absolute difference sets for another two spatial features, curvature angle and curvature distance, proposed by and defined in [12] . We can see that most differences between two corresponding elapsed time values, 82.97% of differences on the same device type and 74.73% on the different device types, are less than 3. Fig. 5 shows the construction of our NFA system. Our system uses three hash functions 
V. SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
l , where l is determined by the security level. Our system consists of three phases: feature reconciliation, key generation, and key confirmation. Feature reconciliation is to remove differences between Alice's and Bob's sensed data sets. First, Alice and Bob choose m pairs of elapsed time values. Since the difference between the two values in most pairs is less than 3, we let Alice extend her selected set by including a±1, a±2, a±3 for every a in the set (step 5). Then, Alice and Bob privately find the set intersection. We use a private set intersection protocol proposed by [7] to let both parties find the same intersection set V b (step 6). When the same intersection set is obtained by both parties, the binary strings of its elements are concatenated together in a string w. Since w may be of low entropy, we propose to use encrypted key exchange approach [2] . In the protocol, a session key is the hash of all the previous messages and the secret string K A or K B . In this way, a MITM attack will be effectively defended because two honest parties obtain different messages in a MITM attack. The last phase is to let two parties explicitly confirm that the generated keys are same.
VI. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
A. Performance Analysis
Our system may still fail when most selected data are very different from its counterpart. Given a pair of peak points, if their value difference is less than 3, we call them a valid pair. We have shown in Sec. IV-B2 that it is of high rate to select a valid pair. Particularly, more than 70% pairs in our experiments are valid. The failure probability of our system is also affected by the number of the selected elements, m. Having m and the proportion of valid pairs, it is straightforward to calculate the success probability of the reconciliation phase. For example, if m ≥ 7 and the proportion is more than 70%, the success probability is more than 98%.
A conductor puts the two smart devices side by side, slides his two fingers of one hand zigzag on the two screens, and then triggers the authentication process. The two smart devices, Alice and Bob, sense and calculate two elapsed time sets A = {a1, a2, · · · , an} and B = {b1, b2, · · · , bn}, respectively. 
Feature Reconciliation
. Alice randomly permutes all uj's and sends the final set U to Bob. 6 Bob calculates set
If |V| < 4 and it is their first execution, Bob informs Alice and they re-execute step 1-6. If |V| < 4 and it is their second execution, this authentication fails; Bob informs the conductor the failure reason and asks the conductor to start over the authentication. Otherwise, Bob sends set Vx = {xi|bt i ∈ V b } to Alice. By comparing Vx against U, Alice also learns set V b . Alice and Bob now have the same data set V b . Alice (Bob) sorts the elements in the non decreasing order, represents them in binary strings, and concatenates them together in a string, which is denoted by w hereafter.
Key Generation.
7 Alice randomly picks one generator g, two elements M , N from G and sends them to Bob. Alice randomly picks r ←R Zq, calculates R = g r , R = R · M w , and sends R to Bob. 8 Bob randomly picks s ←R Zq, calculates S = g s , S = S·N w , and sends S to Alice. Our system is fully decentralized and does not need any third trusted center or server. The feature reconciliation phase performs O(m log q) group multiplications, where q is group order. The key generation phase needs O(m log q) group multiplications. The key confirmation is done in constant time.
B. Security Analysis
Most security threatens to a NFA system come from MITM attacks and dictionary attacks. In the first phase, the private set intersection protocol guarantees that only a set provider can learn the final intersection set and nothing beyond the intersection. In the second phase, if a MITM adversary changes any intermediate message, Alice and Bob will derive different session keys. This alerts both parties to the existence of an adversary. Further more, if the adversary does not have the intersection set, he cannot get the keys derived by Alice and Bob.
In the traditional private set intersection protocol, an adversary may impersonate one party in the protocol and generate a set of all possible values so that he can infer the honest party's whole input set. However, the feature reconciliation phase restricts the set size, m for Bob and 7m for Alice, to make it difficult for an adversary to enumerate all possible values. Offline dictionary attacks to the key generation phase is also impossible because r, s, M, and N are randomly selected. For an example, R can be viewed as an encryption of message M using key w. Given R = R · M w , an adversary iterates every possible key w to decrypt the ciphertext. However, since the message M itself is chosen randomly and of no meaning, the adversary cannot verify the validity of the obtained plain text. An adversary can carry out online dictionary attacks, guessing a w and interacting with an honest party. But every failure will be captured by an honest party.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of our system. We made a proof-of-concept implementation of our NFA system on a Motorola Droid smartphone, which has a 550MHz ARM A8 processor, 256MB memory, a 16GB SD card, and Android 2.2 OS. This bland specification makes Droid a good representative of the low-end smart devices in today's market.
We first tested whether our feature reconciliation can finish successfully with a high probability. In other words, out of m randomly selected pairs, is it of high probability that two devices can find at least 4 valid pairs? To answer this question, we did 100 experiments on two Droid smartphones and another 100 experiments on a Droid smartphone and a HP TouchPad tablet. Each experiment collected at least 10 peak points. We tested the success rate under different m values. Fig. 6(a) shows the proportion of the experiments in which our system can finish successfully. From the figure, we can see that even if m is only 5, our system can succeed with probability close to 80%. When m increases to 7, data collected from two Droid phones showed a success rate of 97.8% while the rate from two different devices was 90% . When m is 10, the experiments on two different devices also showed a very high success probability, 97%.
For a smartphone protocol, the execution time is critical in the sense that smartphones usually have limited computational and storage resources. As pointed out previously, all our simulation were carried out on a low-end Motorola Droid smartphone. We tested the running time of the feature reconciliation phase, and the key generation phase. We did not test the key confirmation phase since it does not take up much proportion in the system execution time and actually always costs the same time when the security parameter is determined. Our system was implemented in two types of groups: a 1024-bit quadratic residue subgroup of a Galois field modulo a safe prime p and a 160-bit elliptic curve group. According to NIST's guidance [6] , the two groups both have 80-bit security level. The results are shown in 6(b), and 6(c). We remark that the time of the feature reconciliation phase contains the time of generating and verifying zero knowledge proof. We note that the y-axis in the figures are not continuous and we skipped in the middle because there was a big gap between the execution time of the two implementations. To show the details of the plots, we stretched the y-axis and cut off the middle blank area. We evaluated the implementations under different m values introduced in step 1 of the construction.
All the execution time increased linearly with the increase of m. Another obvious observation is that the ECC implementation was overwhelmingly faster than the DL implementation in zero knowledge proof, feature reconciliation, and key generation. The difference is due to the different group size used by the two implementations: the DL implementation used a 1024-bit group and the ECC implementation used a 160-bit group. We thus recommend to use ECC group as the real implementation of our NFA system. In practice, m = 10 is sufficiently large to select 4 pairs of valid peak points. In this case, the ECC implementation took 3.71 and 0.14 seconds to finish first phase and the second phase.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed a near field authentication system which uses a novel and natural human motion, zigzag finger movement, to enforce the spatial closeness. In order to remove the differences between sensed feature data and generate high-entropy session key, we have proposed to use private set intersection and encrypted key exchange in our system.
